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Abstract
We report an experimental test of the hypothesis that contrasting traditions will persist for longer, maintaining cultural
differences between otherwise similar groups, under conditions of uncertainty about payoffs from individual learning. We
studied the persistence of two alternative, experimentally-introduced, task solutions in chains of human participants. In
some chains, participants were led to believe that final payoffs would be difficult to predict for an innovative solution, and
in others, participants were aware that their final payoff would be directly linked to their immediate solution. Although the
difference between the conditions was illusory (only participants’ impressions were manipulated, not actual payoffs) clear
differences were found between the conditions. Consistent with predictions, in the chains that were less certain about final
payoffs, the distinctive variants endured over several replacement ‘‘generations’’ of participants. In contrast, in the other
chains, the influence of the experimentally-introduced solutions was rapidly diluted by participants’ exploration of
alternative approaches. The finding provides support for the notion that rates of cultural change are likely to be slower for
behaviors for which the relationship between performance and payoff may be hard to predict.
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Introduction
Theoretical models predict that individuals should (adaptively)
increase their reliance on social learning where the potential
payoffs from individual learning are uncertain, or difficult to
predict [1,2], and that the outcome of such a trade-off can be,
under some circumstances, suboptimal traditions [3,4]. The
possibility of suboptimal outcomes arises because an increased
reliance on social learning within a population entails a reduction
in innovation, and therefore less exploration of potentially superior
alternatives. Of course, the behavior of the population is generally
expected to move in the direction of optimality, but an increased
reliance on social learning would be expected to result in slower
rates of cultural change. Since the degree of reliance on social
learning may be a function of the predictability of the payoff, it
follows that payoff predictability may be an important determining
factor with regard to the longevity of particular behavioral
traditions. In the current study, we have taken an experimental
approach to the question of strategic trade-offs between social and
individual learning, and the consequence of this balance for the
persistence of particular cultural traits. Our expectation is that
rates of cultural change will be slower when payoffs are more
difficult to predict.
Experimental approaches to studying human culture have
become increasingly common in the recent evolutionary literature
[5,6,7]. These methods involve chains of participants taking part
in the experimental task in succession, with opportunities to
interact with or observe their immediate predecessors. However,
to date there are few such studies focused on the question of the
persistence or otherwise of group-specific traditions.
In an early example of this approach, Jacobs and Campbell [8]
investigated the persistence of a counterintuitive belief (introduced
by experimental confederates) within chains of participants. Jacobs
and Campbell concluded that all persistent cultural beliefs (even
demonstrably counterfactual ones, such as superstitions) must have
some inherent value, as social influence alone was insufficient to
support arbitrary traditions in the face of ‘‘continuous spontaneous
innovation in a natural direction’’ (p657). Following this up, Weick
and Gilfillan [9] found that an experimentally introduced
(effective) strategy for solving their experimental task was faithfully
transmitted over multiple generations, whereas a more complicat-
ed alternative was rapidly abandoned.
In previous studies chains of participants (or laboratory
‘‘microsocieties’’, [5,8]) have been presented with simple building
tasks with clear objective goals (building paper airplanes to fly as
far as possible, and building towers from raw spaghetti to be as tall
as possible) [10,11,12]. In these experiments, participants were not
exposed to any experimental manipulation regarding the initial
solution. The first participant therefore cannot use social
information at all, but later participants can make use of
information gleaned from observing earlier efforts from their
own chain. In these studies it was found that social and individual
learning were combined adaptively by the participants, to produce
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the ‘‘ratcheting’’ characteristic of human cumulative culture [13],
with solutions becoming increasingly effective over generations.
This adaptive integration of social learning and innovation was
accompanied by some evidence of contrasting design traditions.
Caldwell and Millen [10] found that participants’ tower and plane
designs were more similar to other designs from their own chain,
compared with those from different chains.
Furthermore, in a condition in which personal payoffs were
more difficult to predict (because tower height was measured after
a delay and some perturbation of the tower), traditions appeared
stronger, implying a greater reliance on social learning over
innovation. However, in this previous study, the persistence of
traditions could only be inferred from the measures of within-
chain and between-chain similarity. It was not possible to track the
longevity of particular design features as there was no experimen-
tal manipulation of the tower designs to which participants were
exposed. As a result of this, similarity was measured by using the
subjective ratings of naı¨ve coders asked to compare pairs of towers
[12]. It therefore remains possible that the higher similarity ratings
in the unpredictable payoffs condition were not a result of higher
fidelity copying, but an outcome of certain designs being preferred,
or a smaller range of design types being preferred, in the
unpredictable payoffs condition, in which the importance of tower
stability was strongly emphasized [12].
Our aim in the current study was therefore to implement a
direct experimental test of the hypothesis that particular designs
will persist for longer when the likely payoffs for innovative
strategies are difficult to predict, using the spaghetti tower task
from previous experiments [10,12]. To do this we have
experimentally manipulated the initial solutions presented to the
early generation participants of each chain, exploiting the logic of
‘‘two-action’’ designs, such that it is possible to track the influence
of our two alternative ‘‘seed’’ solutions along the chains. A
previous study using the same two alternative designs in the
context of a dyadic social learning experiment [14] established that
one of these alternatives was objectively suboptimal to the other.
This therefore offered the additional possibility of tracking the
relative rates of change of the two tower types (of varying
effectiveness) under different payoff conditions. In the current
study we also wanted to ensure that participants’ primary focus
was their performance on the task, rather than, for example,
fulfilling the expectations of fellow group members. Payment for
participation was therefore directly (and steeply) related to task
score, and participants did not take part in the task face-to-face,
but were simply shown photographs of their predecessors’
solutions. In addition, we created the two payoff conditions such
that there was no difference between them other than participants’
impressions about the directness of the relationship between
immediate solution and final payoff. The apparent difference
between the conditions was therefore entirely illusory.
We predicted that participants would show significant matching
to the seed variant for their chain, compared with the alternative
seed. We also predicted that copying would be stronger in the
condition in which the relationship between solution and payoff
was more unpredictable, and that this would result in greater
persistence of the features of seed designs in later generations of
chains in this condition. Finally, we predicted any differences in
persistence of the designs between the predictable and unpredict-
able payoff conditions would be most marked for the suboptimal
tower design, which was expected to be more rapidly modified in
the predictable payoff chains.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Ethical approval for this research was provided by the
University of Stirling Psychology Ethics Committee. The proce-
dure was explained to all participants in advance, and each gave
written consent to participate. All participants were over 16 years
of age and were therefore able to give full informed consent.
Design
Participants were assigned to one of twenty chains of
participants, with five participants to each chain (see Table 1).
The chains were seeded with towers which had in fact been built
by the experimenter to a specific design. Half of the chains were
seeded with photographs of one type, and the other half were
seeded with photographs of a contrasting design. Examples of seed
photographs of each design (which we have labeled ‘‘cubic’’ and
‘‘tripod’’) are shown in Fig. 1. These two alternative tower designs
were selected because they represented fairly typical tower types
based on previous experiments using this task which relied solely
on participants’ spontaneous design choices, without interference
from designs created by an experimenter [10,12]. These two
designs are also distinctly different, with several features that can
be identified to distinguish them. This permitted an objective
coding scheme to be developed, based on these contrasting
features (Table 2).
Seed tower type, and payoff predictability were manipulated
independently of each other, so five replicate chains were run in
each of the four resulting conditions: cubic unpredictable; cubic
predictable; tripod unpredictable; tripod predictable.
Participants
One hundred participants were recruited to take part in the
study, 66 of whom were recruited on campus at the University of
Stirling, and 34 of whom were recruited at Glasgow Science
Centre (http://www.gsc.org.uk). Initially we ran twenty chains of
five participants, with five chains in each of the four conditions.
Within the predictable payoffs condition, there was an even
balance of University to Science Centre participants (25:25).
However, in the unpredictable condition, only nine participants
were run at Glasgow Science Centre. These were confined to two
chains (one cubic and one tripod). In the Science Centre
environment it proved rather more difficult to generate the
intended level of apprehension about the purported structural tests
(see Procedure section for details of the unpredictable condition
manipulation). Testing was carried out behind a makeshift visual
barrier, rather than in a purpose-built participant testing room, as
was used for University participants, and an apparent lack of any
additional equipment may have seriously affected the believability
of this manipulation. Subsequent analyses corroborated these
impressions, indicating that these participants performed differ-
ently to those recruited on campus in the same condition. These
two chains were therefore excluded from the analyses reported
here. However, it should be noted that all analyses have also been
performed without exclusion, with no change to the significance or
otherwise of the results. Of the 90 non-excluded participants, 60
were female and 30 male. Their mean age was 23.5 years
(SD= 6.3).
All participants took part in return for an incentive fee, which
was determined by their success on the task. On top of a base rate
of £1, they were paid 50 pence for every 10 cm of height
achieved. The mean sum earned was £3.14, the maximum was
£7, and the minimum was the base fee of £1. Participants
recruited at the University were paid in cash, and those recruited
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at Glasgow Science Centre were paid in vouchers which could be
exchanged for food and drink at the on-site cafe´. Science Centre
vouchers were provided in increments of one pound, so
participants whose earnings were not an exact multiple of one
pound had their fee rounded up to the nearest whole pound (but
were unaware that this would be the case until after the
experiment had been completed).
Apparatus
Each participant was provided with one 500 g packet of
spaghetti, plus approximately 200 g of red Newplast modeling
material.
Procedure
Participants were shown photographs of the towers built by the
previous two participants in their chain. The first participant in
each chain was shown the two seed towers (see Design section).
The second participant in each chain was shown only one of the
seed photographs, plus the photograph of the tower built by the
first participant. The third, fourth and fifth participant in each
chain were shown only photographs of towers built by real
participants (see Table 1).
Participants were informed that the goal of the spaghetti tower
building task was to build a tower as tall as possible using the
spaghetti and modeling clay. They were also informed that they
would be shown photographs of the solutions of two previous
participants, and that they would be given three minutes to study
them and develop a strategy for their own tower, prior to a seven
minute building period in which they would complete their own
tower. In the predictable payoffs condition, participants were
simply told that the reward system was related to the height of
their tower, and that they would receive 50 p for every 10 cm of
height achieved, on top of their £1 base fee. In the unpredictable
payoffs condition, participants were given identical information
about the reward structure, but were also told that upon
completion of their tower they would be asked to leave the testing
area while their tower underwent a series of structural tests which
would last around five minutes. It was emphasized that only after
these tests had been completed would the tower be measured and
the final payment determined, and that should their tower fail the
tests and collapse, this would result in a corresponding reduction in
the final payment. It was also emphasized to participants in the
unpredictable payoffs condition that photographs were taken after
the structural tests had been completed, so the photographs that
they were shown depicted the final height of those towers. In
reality no such structural tests were completed, as the experi-
menter simply sat in the testing area with the completed tower for
the specified period without touching it, so in effect rewards were
determined in an identical manner in both conditions.
Photographs were taken with a measuring tape in the
background, and with the height measurement clearly displayed
alongside the tower (Fig. 1).
Data Coding and Analysis
Towers built by participants were coded according to the
features they had in common with the two alternative seed towers.
Features were coded as either cubic-like, or tripod-like (Table 2).
All photographs were coded according to this scheme by both
authors working independently. The ratings showed high concor-
dance, suggesting that the scores could be assigned with high
reliability using this coding scheme (Spearman’s Rho for cubic
features: r= .909, n= 100, p,0.0005; for tripod features: r= .942,
n= 100, p,0.0005).
In the predictable payoff condition, participants from the two
different recruitment sites (see Participants section) exhibited
comparable levels of copying, and built towers of equivalent
height, so these data were combined in subsequent analyses.
Where data were non-normally distributed (exhibiting significant
Table 1. The chain design.
Participant Number Solutions Viewed
P1 Seed 1, Seed 2
P2 Seed 2, P1
P3 P1, P2
P4 P2, P3
P5 P3, P4
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099708.t001
Table 2. The coding scheme used to quantify the similarity of participants’ towers to the two seed tower types.
Tower Feature Cubic Tripod
Base contact Modeling clay and spaghetti (1) Modeling clay only (1)
Base shape Square (1) Triangular (1)
Lower level structure Vertical from modeling clay contact
points, not converging to single
point (1)
Approximately vertical converging to single point (1)
Upper level structures Horizontal joins between vertical
uprights (0.5), and converges to a
single point at highest point (0.5)
Single vertical element as highest level (0.5), with any/all
upper levels as single verticals (0.5)
Numbers indicate the points attributed to towers displaying those features as their cubic and tripod feature scores.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099708.t002
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skewness and/or kurtosis) nonparametric statistics were used.
Two-tailed probabilities are reported.
Results
Individual-level Copying of Observed Solutions
The degree of overlap between any given tower and its two
immediate predecessors (i.e. those the participant had the
opportunity to view) was calculated in order to give a measure
of direct copying from observed solutions. We used the proportion
of features shared between any two towers, in relation to the total
number of features (shared + unshared) exhibited across both
towers, as well as the absolute number of shared features.
Participants in the unpredictable condition matched the towers
they were shown significantly more than those in the predictable
condition. For the absolute number of shared features, in the
unpredictable condition the mean was 2.41 (SD= 1.11), compared
with 1.77 (SD= 1.09) in the predictable condition (t= 2.753,
df= 88, p= 0.006). For the proportional overlap measure, the
mean was 0.53 (SD= 0.28) in the unpredictable condition and 0.39
(SD= 0.25) in the predictable condition (t= 2.364, df= 88,
p= 0.020).
Matching to Seeds
The degree of matching to original seed towers was analyzed
over chains using repeated measures analyses. The average
number of features matching the original seed tower was
calculated for each chain, for its early generation (1 and 2,
exposed to the seeds) and late generation (3, 4 and 5, not directly
exposed to the seeds) participants. The corresponding descriptive
statistics are displayed in Table 3. A 26262 ANOVA was
performed, with generation (early; late) as a repeated measures
variable, and payoff condition (predictable; unpredictable) and
seed tower type (cubic; tripod) as between-subjects variables.
There was a main effect of generation, with early generation
towers matching more closely to their original seed than late
generation towers (F1,14 = 9.924, p = 0.007). In line with the
hypothesis there was also a main effect of payoff condition, with
stronger matching to the seed in the unpredictable condition
(F1,14 = 8.744, p = 0.010). There was no main effect of tower type
(F1,14 = 0.810, p = 0.383), indicating that the two designs were
equally well copied. Interactions were all non-significant. For
generation by payoff condition, F1,14 = 0.169, p= 0.687; for
generation by tower type, F1,14 = 0.300, p= 0.592; for payoff
condition by tower type, F1,14 = 1.545, p= 0.234; and for the
three-way interaction between generation, payoff condition, and
tower type, F1,14 = 0.300, p= 0.592.
In addition, in order to test for above chance-level matching to
seed type, all towers were given a score to indicate the proportion
of features they had in common with their seed tower, in relation
to the total number of features that they had in common with
either seed type. Scores were therefore calculated as: features
shared with seed tower/(features shared with seed tower + features
shared with alternative seed). These scores thus ranged between 0
and 1, with 0 indicating a tower with no features in common with
the seed tower type, and 1 indicating a tower with no features in
common with the alternative seed type, and 0.5 indicating an
equal number of features from the seed and alternative tower
types. The average proportional match to the seed was calculated
for each chain, again for both the early (1 and 2) and late (3, 4 and
5) generation participants (see Fig. 2). Since there was no effect of
tower type in the previous analysis involving matching to seeds,
these data were combined for the purpose of this analysis. Using a
one-sample t-test against a chance level proportion of 0.5, the
unpredictable payoff condition showed significant matching to
seed for both early (t= 3.535, df= 7, p = 0.010), and late (t= 2.961,
df= 7, p= 0.021) generations. In contrast, in the predictable payoff
condition, although the trend was in the direction of matching for
the early generations, this was not significant (t= 1.241, df= 9,
p= 0.246), and there was not even a trend in the direction of
matching for the late generations (t=20.331, df= 9, p= 0.748).
Height of Cubic and Tripod Condition Towers
Height data were also treated as repeated measures data within
chains. Figure 3 displays the mean height data for the four
different conditions, for all positions in the chain (including seed
towers). As before a 26262 ANOVA was performed, with
generation (early; late) as a repeated measures variable, and payoff
condition (predictable; unpredictable) and seed tower type (cubic;
tripod) as between-subjects variables. Descriptive statistics are
displayed in Table 3. There was a main effect of tower type
(F1,14 = 13.158, p= 0.003), with towers built in the tripod-seed
condition taller than those built in the cubic-seed condition. There
was no main effect of either generation (F1,14 = 0.038, p = 0.848),
or payoff condition (F1,14 = 0.970, p = 0.341). Interactions were all
non-significant. For generation by payoff condition, F1,14 = 0.471,
p= 0.504; for generation by tower type, F1,14 = 0.609, p= 0.448;
for payoff condition by tower type, F1,14 = 0.589, p= 0.456; and for
the three-way interaction between generation, payoff condition,
and tower type, F1,14 = 0.930, p= 0.351. Since the only significant
influence on height was seed tower type, data were combined in
further analyses of the differences in height between cubic and
tripod condition towers.
The seed towers in the tripod conditions were themselves taller
than those in the cubic condition (tripod seeds = 54 cm & 53 cm;
cubic seeds = 44 cm & 45 cm). However this in itself did not
appear to fully account for the difference. Participants in the tripod
condition built towers that were comparable in height to the seeds
(mean height = 54.49 cm, one-sample t-test against seed height of
53.50 cm: t= 0.302, df= 44, p = 0.764), but participants in the
cubic condition built towers that were somewhat lower than their
original seeds, although this did not quite reach significance (mean
height = 39.22 cm, one-sample t-test against seed height of
44.50 cm: t= 1.818, df= 44, p = 0.076).
In the cubic condition there was a significant negative
correlation between the match-to-seed proportional measure and
height (Spearman’s Rho: r=2436, N= 45, p = 0.003), suggesting
that a tendency to adhere to the cubic design was actually
counterproductive. No such relationship was apparent for the
tripod condition (Spearman’s Rho: r=2.009, N= 45, p = 0.954).
Figure 1. Examples of the seed towers: cubic (A) and tripod (B)
designs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099708.g001
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Discussion
As predicted, greater copying was observed in the unpredictable
payoffs condition, compared with the predictable payoff condition,
indicating that this manipulation triggered a greater reliance on
social learning. This high level of matching meant that in this
condition the influence of the particular seed design could be
detected in the towers built by even the later participants in that
chain, who had not actually observed the seeds for themselves.
The effect of generation on the degree of matching to seeds,
common across both payoff conditions, suggests that this effect
would become diluted back to chance level within another few
generations. Within the context of our experiment therefore, these
cultural founder effects are probably fairly transient. However, the
unpredictability of the personal payoffs within our experiment was
merely relative; the task itself remains a highly transparent one
when compared with typical real-world examples of social learning
in humans. Consequently, the fact that we can nonetheless identify
such a striking difference between the two conditions in our
experiment implies that similar real-world effects are in fact liable
to be extremely powerful.
Consistent with previous work [14] we also found evidence that
the cubic design was less effective than the tripod design.
Nonetheless these two designs were equally well copied. Indeed,
contrary to our prediction, there was not even any evidence to
suggest that the cubic design was eroded more rapidly than the
tripod design in the predictable payoffs condition, as the
interaction effects involving tower type and payoff condition were
non-significant. Interestingly, this implies that participants in the
unpredictable payoffs condition were not disadvantaged by their
greater reliance on social learning, as the slower rates of change
permitted some preservation of both designs, including the more
effective tripod approach, whereas both were equally eroded in the
predictable payoff chains.
In line with this interpretation, the height data indicates that
there was no overall difference between the predictable and
unpredictable payoff conditions in terms of this goal measure.
Perhaps more surprisingly, there was also no significant interaction
between payoff condition and seed tower condition. However,
given the small number of replicates involved in this analysis (4
chains cubic predictable, 4 chains tripod predictable, 5 chains
cubic unpredictable, 5 chains tripod unpredictable) it is possible
that this was attributable to low statistical power. It is worth noting
that the trends are in the direction one would expect (Table 3),
with the cubic unpredictable towers the least successful in terms of
the height goal.
It is likely that the participants in our experiment (in both
conditions) were behaving in a highly rational manner, weighing
up the likely benefits, and potential risks, associated with copying a
previous solution, or attempting something different. In both
conditions the payoff was probably relatively predictable for an
attempt to reproduce a previous solution, whereas the payoff for a
novel solution was less predictable (albeit potentially more
profitable). In the unpredictable condition, the uncertainty of the
payoff for a novel solution was enhanced by the knowledge that
even the height of one’s completed tower was not necessarily a
good indication of final payoff. The decision to play safe in this
condition, and attempt something similar to a previous solution, is
therefore very understandable. Our study illustrates that such
reasoning at the individual-level can have population-level
consequences in terms of the rates of change in the cultural
evolutionary process.
The broader implications of this result may have consequences
for our understanding of the extraordinarily powerful influence of
social learning in humans, compared with other species. Much of
human technology (and indeed that of our hominid ancestors from
around 1.5 million years ago, e.g. [15]) would fall within our
classification of ‘‘unpredictable payoffs’’, since tool manufacture is
generally separated from use in both time and space. Indeed,
Gergely and Csibra [16,17] have argued that human-unique social
learning mechanisms may have evolved in response to the need for
preserving ‘‘recursive technologies’’ (such as tools manufactured to
produce other tools), where ultimate goals are not immediately
obvious to the naı¨ve learner.
Nonetheless, for modern humans (both historically, and in
contemporary society) particular decisions can still be classified as
having either relatively predictable or relatively unpredictable
Table 3. Mean features matching original seed tower, and mean tower heights.
Payoff Condition
Tower
Type
Features Matching Original
Seed Tower (see Table 2) Height (cm)
Early Gens. Late Gens. Early Gens. Late Gens.
Unpredictable Cubic 3.00 (0.46) 2.50 (0.36) 32.75 (14.71) 36.50 (9.29)
Tripod 2.38 (0.92) 1.88 (0.16) 60.00 (10.90) 48.58 (10.81)
Predictable Cubic 1.95 (0.94) 1.10 (0.84) 41.80 (15.11) 43.13 (17.48)
Tripod 1.85 (0.95) 1.40 (0.53) 53.80 (14.62) 56.73 (7.70)
Early indicates generations 1 & 2, and Late indicates generations 3, 4 & 5. Predictable and Unpredictable indicate the two different payoff conditions, and Cubic and
Tripod indicate the two different seed tower conditions. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099708.t003
Figure 2. Mean match proportion scores (+/21SE) for the two
payoff conditions. Early indicates generations 1 & 2, and late
indicates generations 3, 4 & 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099708.g002
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outcomes for the user, and we might expect to see accordingly fast
or slow rates of change in cultural practices. As a simple example,
choice of fertilizer, or method of planting, might affect one’s crop
yield later in the year, but this connection would likely be relatively
opaque to the user, and there would be a significant delay between
implementation of a novel technique or product, and feedback on
its effectiveness. In contrast, new harvesting machinery might well
have clear benefits to the user in terms of time efficiency and/or
reduced wastage, and furthermore this would be apparent from
first usage. We would hence expect relatively more predictable
payoff decisions such as this to exhibit steeper adoption curves for
beneficial innovations.
In conclusion, our study indicates that adaptive social learning
strategies [8,9] can result in different rates of cultural change as a
consequence of the degree of reliance on social learning versus
innovation. Uncertainty about payoffs in particular may be an
important predictor of the cultural turnover rate for a given
behavior.
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